The only around is through
Iqbal Mustafa

Printed in NEWS 04 July, 2004


Quo Vadis
Whither are you Going

For this new series of columns, I have symbolically chosen the title from the call of the Roman guards when they addressed passers by: Quo Vadis, where are you going? In the previous series, 'Inside view' I took a retrospective approach, dilating upon many areas that affect our lives by dint of institutional management of the country. While responding positively many readers complained that I was finding faults but not proffering solutions.

In this series, I am taking a prospective view of things where we can look at the paths ahead and the choices available. There is no certainty in determining destiny but it certainly helps knowing a little about the paths ahead.

Iqbal Mustafa.
February 2004

Last week's events moved with uncanny smoothness to re-arrange the pieces on Pakistan's political chessboard that reinforced General Musharraf's tactical position. It is even more admirable if we were to believe him that he had nothing to do with it, and that the pieces had the good sense to re-arrange themselves. Tactically, it was coup de grace for parliamentary democracy. Strategically, the weight of history is against him. As a nation if we had a little sense of history, we would not be where we are today but that is another story.

The consolidation of General Musharraf's power is growing with inverse proportion to his approval ratings and credibility with the general public and neutral observers. The merit of this regime's legitimacy, or its performance, or its direction notwithstanding, its actions are certainly creating more polarisations in the society. Perceptions are equally as important as reality. It is easier for people to follow a crook who they trust rather than a saint who they doubt. In the absence of independent academia or institutions to provide objective socio-political analysis, extreme views flourish wildly. There is a school of opinion that equates General Musharraf with Hazrat Umar and Alla-Uddin Khilji for his sagacious leadership and on the opposite side of the spectrum there are sceptics who are convinced that he is no more than an agent of American interests in the region.

Both perceptions feed on certain facts. He has proven a dexterous administrator to have kept Pakistan's raucous polity under reigns while managing the economic front effectively in terms of damage control. Also, he has re-aligned Pakistan's defence and foreign policy in tune with American inclinations in the region, which is not necessarily antipathetic to Pakistan's long term interests. He has tried to salvage the damage caused by Pakistan's previous policies on Afghanistan, nuclear technology and Kashmir under a broad ideological umbrella of 'enlightened moderation'. He is at logger heads with the ogre of terrorism that is a spill over from past militant policies. With the exception of the chauvinist elements who run their political shop on polished theological brass, no one can deny that he has chosen the right direction. Now, whether he has moved fast enough or whether his motivation is questionable, are not strong enough grounds to paint him and his government with a tar brush, as far as he is moving in a direction that is beneficial for the country.

While it is true that the opposition that has its own power-axe to grind, there are two questions that loom large in everyone's mind. One, how did General Musharraf assume the authority to make such fundamental policy decisions for the country and two, as he has made the decisions, is he building a national consensus on these issues. In an age of such loud clamour for democracy, no one relishes impositions however beneficial they are or however benevolent the imposer. Even children rebel against decisions imposed by parents today however well intentioned they may be. The form is equally as critical as the substance.

So while the substance of his actions may be acceptable, the form is causing much invective. In a crisis situation, half measures often don't work. All his well-intentioned plans to salvage Pakistan's position from internal and external threats have been compromised because of the form adopted. He inherited an internal political crisis (with the contribution of the choices he made) and an international isolation. While he rolled up his sleeves to put the house in order, the inescapable phantom of legitimacy began to haunt him, as it always does for every ruler who doesn't come to power though constitutional doors. Only a successful 'moral war' can legitimise the power of usurpers.

The first strategic mistake he committed was to wage a moral war of accountability simultaneously with economic revival. The two are incongruent always, especially in third world countries where corruption and cronyism are so rampant and deep that it is a political non-issue. To attack corruption and cleaning up the house requires sacrificing a few years of economic growth, as most revolutions do. The accountability process lead by NAB had to be abandoned to facilitate private sector economic initiative - entrepreneurs cannot lead economic activities while looking over their shoulders or dreading a mid-night knock on the door. His regime lost face when accountability stumbled and seemed selective.

The second blunder was to hold a referendum. Till then, he had been claiming to be apolitical; only there to pave way for democracy with no political interest. Referendum is very much a political process. The moment he adopted that route he implicitly reneged his apolitical claim.

The third faux pas was to use the parliamentary form of democracy for a quasi-presidential system. October 2002 elections and LFO drove the last nail in the coffin of his credibility. In the plan to install a parliamentary form of democracy in the country, so many compromises had to be made in selection of supporters that credibility further eroded. The democratically elected supporters - from diverse political backgrounds - demanded their pound of flesh in lieu of political support, which derailed the continuity of previous economic policies in key ministries of Agriculture, Industries and Commerce. Finance held its path because of Mr. Shaukat Aziz. The bonanza of post Nine Eleven conditions helped boost up foreign exchange reserves, exports and eased debt retirement liabilities. The unruly House and rather inane command of Mr. Jamali necessitated further tinkering to the contrived parliamentary democracy, which has been stretched to the limit now. Any further prodding will burst its seams.

With all good intents, the attempt to go round the system is failing. Installation of Mr. Shaukat Aziz as the next P.M. will not bring the harmony, legitimacy and stability required of a government to function in peace. It will lead to dissolution of the assembly and appointment of an interim P.M. who will conveniently be in place by the time. We would be back to the square one!

It would be far more honest and practical to adopt a presidential system of government where legislative and executive powers are permanently divorced. A directly elected president can be free to induct professionally competent ministers to run the state while elected representatives can sit in the Assembly and the Senate to legislate and monitor the government. (Mr. Shaukat Aziz will not have to break bread with voters in Tharparker). In place of the contentious National Security Council, a National Constitutional Council can be created (like in France) with a broad representation as an apex conflict resolution body.

This monumental change would require one big effort instead of the continuous shepherding now required to keep the boat from rocking every few months. With the pliant political following congregated around General Musharraf, it should not be all that hard to muster the consensus for political change. This is what he wants, and this is what is needed to create some sanity in Pakistani politics. The only way around is to go through. Go for it Mr. President. You will earn a place in history besides making our lives much simpler and restoring integrity to Pakistani politics.

Iqbal Mustafa
1150 words
3 July 2004