Countering or Coexisting with India
Iqbal Mustafa

Printed in NEWS December 05, 2004


Quo Vadis
Whither are you Going

For this new series of columns, I have symbolically chosen the title from the call of the Roman guards when they addressed passers by: Quo Vadis, where are you going? In the previous series, 'Inside view' I took a retrospective approach, dilating upon many areas that affect our lives by dint of institutional management of the country. While responding positively many readers complained that I was finding faults but not proffering solutions.

In this series, I am taking a prospective view of things where we can look at the paths ahead and the choices available. There is no certainty in determining destiny but it certainly helps knowing a little about the paths ahead.

Iqbal Mustafa.
February 2004

Pakistan is poised at a fork of history - there are only two roads ahead - one leads towards the model of Malaysian progress and the other towards being marginalized in the community of nations like Ethiopia or Afghanistan by becoming a basket case. Unfortunately there is no middle path any more. In a fiercely competitive world all benchmarks are external - either you are gaining or you are loosing to others. No longer can a country afford to set benchmarks against its own historical trends alone. The luxury of maintaining a status quo is no more there either.

Within this larger perspective, we can begin by focussing on the shadow that India casts on Pakistan. Historical and geographical context locks Pakistan with India like Siamese twins who cannot live with each other and cannot live without either. Partition created two siblings with harsh political differences. Ideological divisions and ragged edges of partition gave birth to mutual suspicions that hardened to irreconcilable acrimony over time as events lead both nations down warpaths many times, beginning with Kashmir that has remained till this day the cornerstone of conflict. The issue evokes the fundamental strong sentiments of partition. Time has not healed old wounds and Kashmir is a sore issue that keeps creating fresh ones. It is as if the solution of Kashmir will validate the ideological position on partition for the winning side: So neither side will concede an inch since the psychological stakes are higher than merely Kashmir's geographical and political fate.

Global events have created forces pushing both sides towards a détente. The heat of external pressures has softened the hard stand on both sides and a process of composite dialogue has begun that includes Kashmir as a key issue. As the two sides have begun to feel one another like two wranglers in an arena, it seems as if Pakistan is more keen for a break through in the five decade old deadlock, while India is content with a power play of status quo in the hope of wearing the opponent down to submission. In this perspective, a key question that we, as Pakistanis, must be asking ourselves is to what extend should we be prepared to concede for arriving at a solution? Or, putting it another way, what will be the cost of not resolving the Kashmir issue, and whether 150 million Pakistanis ought to be made to pay this cost for 6.5 odd million Kashmiris in Indian held Jammu and Kashmir? Another question follows from this. If India fails to correspond for an acceptable solution of Kashmir, should Pakistan then continue with normalization in other areas or draw back to the same old position that it has held for the past 50 years?

The answers to all these critical questions relate to an objective and empirical analysis of India's strength and potential. In the past Pakistan's foreign policy towards India has operated on three features: 1) National security perceptions have resided in narrow confines of territorial safety for which three-to-one parity was maintained militarily although India is six times the size of Pakistan. 2) Conflict was engaged through immediate tactical manoeuvres based on threats and opportunities as they appeared from time to time - without a long-term vision and a consistent political philosophy to guide, monitor and evaluate actions. 3) In diplomatic and economic ranking, the relative parity that existed for 50 years was assumed a constant.

None of these features or perceptions holds any bearing to contemporary realities. Pakistan's security threats are not territorial only; post 9/11 developments have added new dimensions to external threats and pressures including those from India. The one-to-three parity is not sustainable anymore. Even with the current trends of Pakistan spending twice as much as India on defence as percentage of GDP, the military parity will drop to one-to-five within five years. And India's defence budget will equal Pakistan's total GDP in fifteen years time. Tactical manoeuvres without political planning have caused more damage and undone whatever gains were made diplomatically - Kargil adventure, for example. Lastly, India's growing economic strength with commensurate diplomatic advantage is shattering Pakistan's illusions of parity that were.
Peter Drucker, the management guru has stated that, "India is becoming a power house very fast. The medical School in New Delhi is now perhaps the best in the world. And technology graduates of the Indian Institute of Information Technology in Banglore are as good as any in the world. So India is becoming a knowledge centre." Out of the Fortune 500 companies, 100 have set-up their R&D facilities in India. Many of the leading state of art new technology products are being designed and developed in India by likes of GE, Monsanto, Daimler, Chrysler, HP and Aston Martin.

India's country profile is impressive today: Home to nearly 1 billion people and large, growing consumer class estimated at 200 million people with English as main language. It has an adequate pool of scientists, engineers, managers and labour force available at competitive costs; it has well developed basic R & D infrastructure, technical and marketing services. It has a mature financial sector and capital market with over 8500 listed companies and market capitalisation of 2 trillion US $. Last year, foreign investment of 4.7 billion dollars flowed into India. Its Foreign exchange reserves stand at 120 billion dollars (ten times that of Pakistan), exports are growing at 20 percent with a diverse range of products in high tech categories. Indian economy has taken off already on a high rise curve. It is the 5th largest economy in the world with a GDP of 2.6 trillion dollars, growing at a rate of around 6 percent since 1991 and projected to grow at 8 percent in coming years. Many economists estimate that Indian economy will equal US economy by year 2050. (Pakistan's GDP is ranked 27th at 311 billion dollars, which is roughly 12 percent of India's. With slower growth rate in Pakistan, the gap is likely to widen. Econometric models indicate that by 2010 Pakistan's economy will be 9 percent of India's.)

Its obvious that time is on India's side. Pakistan has a rapidly closing window of opportunity, despite the false sense of nuclear security, to resolve conflicts with India. In Volume 19 of the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru printed in 1996, he is quoted as writing to Shiekh Abdullah, "We are superior to Pakistan in military and industrial power. But that superiority is not so great as to produce results quickly in war or by fear of war. Therefore, our national interest demands that we should adopt a peaceful policy towards Pakistan and, at the same time, add to our strength. Strength ultimately comes not from defence forces, but the industrial and economic background behind them. As we grow in strength, and we are likely to do so, Pakistan will feel less and less inclined to threaten or harass us, and a time will come when, through sheer force of circumstances, it will be in a mood to accept a settlement which we consider fair, whether in Kashmir or elsewhere."

Perhaps that time has come, as Pakistan seems eager to resolve the Kashmir conflict. The key question is whether we intend to resolve historical conflict with India on a tactical level or a primary conceptual level. In my humble opinion the tactical approach is bound to fail, as in the past. We have to seek conceptual solutions from within our own mindset and from Indian cooperation. In place of seeking a strategy to counter Indian power - as our conditioned responses dictate - I suggest we re-align our security perceptions to co-exist with Indian Power. We should have learned the cardinal lesson from the collapse of the Russian empire - a third world economy cannot sustain a military super power.

P.S
India's perception of a 'fair settlement' is a variable that will constantly change in accord with its economic and military power with time. What India is prepared to offer today may not be deemed 'fair' a few years down the line. While it is prepared to concede parts of Kashmir and Northern areas today, it may not tomorrow.

Iqbal Mustafa
1350 words
04 December 2004