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The
progressively dissolving foreign policy of Pakistan had three legs:
Support for Taliban, militant stand on Kashmir and development of
nuclear deterrent. The first two have undergone fundamental revision
and the mechanics of new directions are in play. The third leg has
been splintered with exposure of proliferation evidence, followed
by confessions of guarded nature. This issue remains to be revised
at a major policy level, in spite of the valiant claims to proceed
undeterred as before. Behind this boyish bravado, questions lurk in
every sensible person's mind that belie a serious concern.
The
three questions are: One, how did the mess-up happen? Two, did the
Government manage the damage control effectively? And three, what
are the options open in the future.
The mess-up began the day Mr. Bhutto decided to sponsor a covert nuclear
development plan in 1974, and the whole nation stood behind the initiative
with a militant zeal. Unlike cold mathematical rules where multiplication
of negative numbers can have a positive resultant, in moral terms,
a negative always negates anything that it relates to. Independent
sovereign states are based on assumptions of irreconcilable adherence
to rule of law; at least on face value and in technicalities. That
is why governments find it hard to deal with outlaws who are not obliged
to follow morals and rules. And whenever an authority cuts corners
in dispensation of justice, there is an outcry from world opinion.
The fundamental rights of worst criminals are supposed to be protected;
only then can an authority assume rights to prosecute. The fate of
Al-Qaida prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is a case in point
where the world opinion is castigating the US.
The furtive nuclear development program compromised Pakistan's moral
chastity. The whole initiative slipped into the murky shadows of international
criminal underworld, out of the realm of sovereign rights. It is always
a slippery downward path to step across the line of legitimacy whether
it is a matter of conjugal fidelity or violation of official rules.
Entering the darkness of lies and deception has no return; to hide
one lie many other have to be spoken and the one sinks deeper into
the quicksand. In case of an authority, there is another caveat. When
the officials at the top compromise legitimacy, the subordinates are
relieved of such obligations; even towards the authority. Moral discipline
becomes impossible to maintain. For that reason, criminal and terrorist
organisations rely on violent force to keep members in line. A legitimate
authority cannot resort to such methods.
This is exactly what happened in Pakistan. Abdicating official control
of the uranium enrichment facility at Kahuta to Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan
in 1975 and giving him a carte-blanche authority to smuggle components
for nuclear technology through underworld connections set the rot
in from day one. After that, it is pointless raising questions as
to why his high profile arrogance and sinfully lavish life style were
not questioned. It was exactly as if the lady of the house were to
connive with the cook to abet her clandestine activities. She compromises
both, her reputation and control over the cook.
Now to say that there was no other way is very questionable. In trying
to match India's nuclear capability we threw moral cautions to the
wind. India's nuclear program had totally different genesis. India
had set up infrastructure early in the fifties for producing nuclear
energy, which could lead to development of weapons. In 1954, India
defied International Atomic Energy Agency by rejecting oversight safeguards.
In 1964, it had setup the first plutonium reprocessing plant at Tromboy.
In 1966 after the withdrawal of US military aid, India announced that
it can produce nuclear weapons in 18 months. In 1968 India refused
to sign the NPT. In 1974 India tests a nuclear device as a peaceful
nuclear explosion. Finally, in 1998 India exploded the bomb. In the
beginning, India's nuclear program was assisted by the US and Canada,
a support that was withdrawn subsequently but all along there was
more of an element of defiance than clandestine shadows to the Indian
program.
In contrast, Pakistan's program was spooky from the start; we denied
its very existence for many decades, although default postal address
for Kahuta plant came to be 'atom bomb factory'. It was the worst
kept secret in the world. The world suspected but could not confront
for one reason or another. In 1976, Canada stopped providing fuel
for Karachi plant. In 1978, France canceled the deal to supply plutonium-reprocessing
plant at Chasma. In 1979 US imposed economic sanctions after Pakistan
is caught importing parts for Kahuta plant. There is a long story
of cat and mouse games that Pakistan played through 80's and 90's
before going open in 1998, in response to India's nuclear tests. The
point is that both countries had arrived at the same point through
different routes. The route Pakistan had taken was full of pitfalls
that were exposed in 2003 by western intelligence agencies. In the
mess that followed, it became impossible to sift through the culpability
of individuals and that of the State.
Next, did Pakistan Government handle the crisis adequately? Polish
thinker, Ryszard Kapuscinski said that, "When is a crisis reached?
When questions arise that can't be answered." This crisis had
been reached in case of Pakistan.
Balancing between appeasing the international pressures and placating
domestic outrage was not an easy task. In my opinion, largely, General
Pervaiz Musharraf did the best that was possible under the circumstances.
His candid confession of ground realities to international press and
clemency for Dr. Khan was the best possible solution. Of course, there
are opinions that he could have involved the politicians, special
committees of the legislature to fudge up procedures, rather than
face the world alone but that would have complicated issues further,
and Pakistan's credibility could have suffered more with such feet
dragging.
The most consequential questions are about the future options for
Pakistan now. There is no point in hiding from the fact that Pakistan's
credibility for securing its nuclear assets has been damaged badly.
Few in the world believe that Dr. Khan is alone responsible for such
a scale of proliferation. And the matter has not been closed forever,
as we would like to believe. There will be many interests and concerns
that will keep trying to reopen the issue, especially as International
Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei told reporters, "Dr.
(Abdul Qadeer) Khan was not working alone,", saying he had help
from people in many different countries. "Dr. Khan is the tip
of an iceberg for us."
Pakistan will have to do far more than a confession and promises of
future vigil. Let us not forget that the US and its allies did not
find any WMDs in Iraq and Syria. They have turned their concerns to
nuclear weapons now. Libya and Iran have been coerced into compliance.
In his speech on Policy for non-proliferation, George Bush did not
implicate Pakistan government but he spent a good fifteen minutes
playing prosecutor general to A.Q. Khan. The implications are quite
clear. In the proposed scheme of things countries suspect of proliferation
will not get any assistance for nuclear technology, even for peaceful
purposes, neither will they deserve a seat in International Atomic
Energy Agency. The noose is tightening around Pakistan.
In these circumstances, Pakistan can take two initiatives to placate
international suspicions. We can sign a bilateral treaty with India
against use of nuclear weapons and some form of limitation on weapons,
like SALT treaties between previous USSR and US. Following that Pakistan
can sign the NPT, since having achieved a nuclear state status, and
the proclaimed nuclear deterrent, Pakistan can afford to invest in
International confidence building measures. This line of action would
harmonize with the revision of the other legs of the foreign policy
mentioned earlier.
We are fortunate, until now, to have the opportunity of living down
past sins and taking a new path to global integration with respect.
Obstinacy at this stage would have very unforgiving consequences.
The greatest boxer of all time, Mohammad Ali once said, "He who
hits and runs away lives to fight another day." This way we can
roll forward and not call it a roll back.
Iqbal Mustafa
11 March 2004
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