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Last
week, in Part - 1 of this topic, we began an analysis of the fundamental
flaws that manifest in the parliamentary system of government in Pakistan.
The first was the nexus between political power and economic bonanza
that shuts the door of politics to the majority except a few families
and individuals.
The economic bonanza has many forms apart from hard cash. There is
a currency of discretionary favours traded freely between voters,
representatives, executives and bureaucracy - appointments, transfers,
promotions, suspensions of petty officials, fake domiciles, NOCs and
other such manipulations, including initiation and suspension of criminal
procedures. It is a sophisticated political stock market. Portfolios
are built of favours dispensed. These assets are traded freely in
secondary 'safarish markets' and eventually en-cashed. The 'net worth'
of a political aspirant includes hard cash as well as the accumulated
political capital, which creates entry barriers for new comers.
Party brand name works in the same way too! Voters assume that larger
and stronger the party is, the bigger its political purse to dispense
favours. The party members bask in the reflected glory and en-cash
it through vote counts. Of course, subsequently a party name gives
them a bigger clout to deal in the 'safarish markets.' The premium
on political party branding hampers people like Imran Khan and Sardar
Farooq Leghari to charter new paths in spite of adequate personal
resources. To break away from the milieu they have to recruit new
political faces who have no political capital in their portfolios.
Success of political parties is related to the sum total of the political
capital of the party and its candidates put together, if other top-level
patronage is discounted; therefore, new parties fail at the polls.
Their leaders get in as lone crusaders because of their personal and
regional influence. Separation of legislature from the executive will
cure this malady largely but more institutional remedies are needed
to break the nexus between political office and en-cashable political
assets.
The next major problem with Westminster model is the obscurity of
roles between different branches of government. The unwritten British
Constitution reposes all sovereignty in the Parliament, wherein the
three arms of governance - legislature, executive and judiciary -
merge like strands of a fabric. The respect for traditions and practices
ensure that state functionaries adhere to the selective roles of the
three branches of government voluntarily and conscientiously. The
good intent and the wisdom to demarcate between these three specific
areas are alien to the parliamentarians in Pakistan.
Parliamentary democracy functions in a composite way through the parliament,
by design. Those elected to the assemblies are primarily legislators
whose mandate limits their role to law making and keeping a check
on the executive. This is a continuous process in assembly sessions.
The executive branch is drawn from the legislature - the cabinet,
the ministers and the prime minister or the chief ministers. Since
the executives are beholden to the legislators for their election
to office, and the legislators perceive themselves as executives in
disguise, the line of distinction vanishes. The support of the legislators
is critical for the survival of the government and this support is
rarely based on ideology or public opinion. Hence, there is a price
extracted for this support from the executives by the legislature
and from the legislature by their respective local pressure groups.
The major thrust of legislature activity runs towards executive functions
- employment in public sector jobs, transfers, postings, promotions,
setting development priorities, provision of licenses for business,
official patronage in police procedures and courts of law and other
such obligations. There is little room or inclination left for legislation
and monitoring of the executive. The low attendance in assemblies
and the poor quality of debate on assembly floor bears a sad testimony
to this state of affairs. The legislators who defy this deviation
from their roles, and try to function within their mandates honestly,
end up disappointing their electorate and party bosses, inviting the
wrath of rejection vote in the next elections.
A constitution is the mother of the trinity of democratic institutions,
the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Like a normal, sane
parent, she must treat her children equitably or else she will sow
seeds of neurosis, which would mutilate the personality of the children
in to something unwholesome. Concisely, this has been the tragedy
of our judicial system.
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has been the bane of constitutional
development in many of the countries, which once formed a part of
the British Empire and look for jurisprudential guidance towards Britain.
A droll English Judge said, "The Parliament can do no wrong although
it can act very foolishly", and it aptly symbolises the cornerstone
of Westminster political philosophy. This inherited supremacy of the
legislature over the judiciary in the system has lent itself admirably
to manipulation in the hands of strong men, posturing on behalf of
an elected legislature, with the fatal consequence of an almost total
atrophy of the viability of the very concept of justice in the society.
The tripod of democracy has one leg missing; the rock of the Armed
Forces is required incessantly to prevent it from tipping over. Given
the feudal disposition and the Westminster model of government, the
legislature and the executive tend to coagulate in personality cults
posing as ideologues. The brew is in reality a modern version of the
old monarchist medicine of the agrarian age; old wine in a new bottle.
Whereas new tricks have replaced old ones to pursue medieval instincts,
the society has lost the traditional methodologies of administering
justice. The judicial machine does not work because it is has been
tampered callously and drastically.
The much talked about independence of the judiciary remains elusive
primarily because of the parliamentary system that does not explicitly
separate the judiciary from the other two branches of government and
leaves it to the good will and voluntary discretion of the executive
branch, which has proven most unscrupulous in this respect.
Finally, the subversion of the civil services has exacerbated the
instability of the parliamentary system. The civil services form the
linchpin of governance structures in any system. Their power and influence
varies from system to system but their role is never the less always
very critical. Whereas the executive branch of a political system
leads and provides the direction, the civil services form the delivery
vehicle. While political leadership is subject to periodic changes,
the bureaucracy stays in place as the inert part of the executive
branch for performing the routine business of procedural obligations
of governance. A neutral and efficient civil service can provide insulation
from violent political shifts in policy and provide the continuity
required for a stable political system. Inevitably, it acquires a
certain character and assertiveness of its own because of its indispensability
to the whole system. Ideally, there should be a colourlessly efficient
bureaucracy functioning quietly behind the executive branch to provide
confidence and stability to the system of governance.
Two main factors have contributed to the bureaucratic failure of governance
in Pakistan. One is the terms of service for the bureaucracy and the
other is the institutional disorientation. By removing constitutional
safeguards, the 1973 constitution, through Article 212, confers exclusive
jurisdiction to the service tribunals in respect of terms and conditions
of service. The bureaucracy has become very vulnerable to manipulative
legislatures, which are traditionally one-man shows in Pakistan. Experience
indicates that the surrender of bureaucracy's constitutional rights
to federal or provincial legislatures' whims has exposed it to political
manipulation at the hands of the democratic representatives as well
as the military rulers. Job insecurity vitiates the independence and
neutrality of civil services. Since independence, institutional orientation
of the civil services has not been revised to meet the needs of times;
it remains frozen in time and has become largely redundant in an increasingly
technical and commercial world. For these handicaps bureaucracy lends
itself well to political manipulation of parliamentarians while remaining
ineffective towards delivery of services to the public.
In view of these serious flaws of the parliamentary system, there
is urgent need to revisit alternative constitutional options. The
impending external and internal threats are stretching governance
abilities to the limit. Without a workable constitution Pakistan shall
remain an artisan with a flawed tool. Parliamentary system stands
totally discredited today.
Iqbal Mustafa
27 March 2004
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