Those who live by the sword, needn't die by the sword
Iqbal Mustafa

Printed in NEWS 11 January 2004


Inside View

This is a series of columns I have started writing from June, 2003 for NEWS. I had imposed a moratorium on my writing for the past seven years since I was attached to the government, first in the capacity of a member of the Central Board of State Bank, and then as CEO, SMEDA.

Now that I am back in the 'civies', so to say, the itch to sharpen my pen became irresistable. This series "Inside View" is based on the experiences and perspectives I gained being an 'insider' for all these years. This is an inside view of an outsider.

Iqbal Mustafa.
June, 2003

There is an old saying from medieval times, "Those who live by the sword, die by the sword." Such old rustic wisdom carries a valuable synthesis of experience. The essence of this proverb applies to individuals as to nations. Here, sword symbolises an irrational or fanatical resort to violence and aggression as a means to achieve ends. History is a graveyard full of men and kingdoms that sought self-actualisation through aggression and eventually perished by it. Nazi Germany, led by Hitler is a classical example; Napoleon and Mussolini are too. In modern times, Taliban and Saddam Hussain exemplify the phenomenon. Many a gangster and mercenaries share the same fate, although for baser reasons.
Fanaticism fails in the end for two reasons: One, it is like a drug that needs increasing doses to have the same effect and there a limit to which fanatical stimulation can rise. It begins to loose its potency and implodes in the end with disillusionment. Second, there is a fatigue factor which invariably sets in after some time and people's intrinsic love for peace and comforts resigns to fanaticism. The inferno of aggressive sentiments between Iraq and Iran burned out after the ten year war in the eighties.

Malignant aggression of the gangsters and mercenaries, as against the ideological aggression of crusaders, does not burn out but is smothered by opposing forces either by superior delinquent powers or by the collective resistance of the law abiding forces of the society.

As the global society has evolved towards a communal existence through the twentieth century, especially after the Second World War, a different phenomenon has begun to emerge. Militancy and aggression needs sustenance of resources. Whether a drug baron, a Mafioso, a militant dictator or a Nation at covert war or a freedom fighter, they all need continuous flow of funds. There is a delicate balance between militancy and resources. Russian empire collapsed because it built a military superpower on a third world economy. Saudi Arabia and Gulf States are vulnerable because their military resources are insufficient to protect their wealth. Israel can afford militancy because of its economic resourcefulness, whether internal or external.

In the war against aggressive threats from Muslim militants (terrorism, as it is labelled) US and its allies have adopted two concurrent strategies: One of pre-emption that involves direct and brutal force (shock and awe) and the other of starving the militants of their sources of funding and sanctuaries.
The 'Establishment' in Pakistan has run out of opportunities to 'play ball on both side of the fence'. It's volte-face on Afghan Policy on gun-point dislodged the firmly imbedded stone of anti-India strategy, based on a need for a 'strategic depth' which has become inverted now since Afghani dissidents are using Pakistan for strategic depth now against US hounding. The moss and grass roots of fanatical sentiments that was anchoring the stone in the soil are exposed to rational scrutiny, both internally and externally. Devoid of a secure mooring in the soil for sustenance the grass roots have begun to wither.

It needs far less leverage to roll the stone down the hill now. The agreement to develop a détente with India has trashed another element of military's 'corporate strategy' that was succinctly (and fallaciously) expressed by General Aslam Baig in early nineties when he proclaimed that the critical mass of forces in Kashmir is half a million soldiers, beyond which India will collapse. This was a misplaced conceptual allegory to what happened in Afghanistan with the Russians.

Having come to terms with these bitter truths from the past, where all previous thinking and planning has proven unsuccessful at a phenomenal cost in terms of blood and resources, the question is where are we heading to? There is much acerbic criticism being hurled at the Establishment today from all quarters, some of it with a sarcastic "I told you so" tenor, and much of it with allegations of betrayal to devoted ideals.

I don't think this a time for scoring points of strategic wisdom; we should let the historians have a say on that. The uncertainty and vulnerability that the end of the status quo brings in its wake is pregnant with foreboding prospects. We need to bury the hatchets, so to say, and put our heads together to evaluate the opportunities and the threats waiting on the road ahead. The winds of change have begun to blow and nothing will stop them now. Starting from Libya's change of heart to return to the fold of international comity of compliant nations, Iran's agreement to cooperate in inspection of their nuclear facilities, pressures on Pakistan to investigate and plug leaks of nuclear technology and North Korea's softened stand are all leading towards open door policies, globally.
Pakistan has been quite an insulated society in every respect - ideologically, politically, economically and socially.

Some visible and some invisible barriers have secured this insularity for the past fifty six years. Political thinking was circumscribed by theology, Allama Iqbal and Mr. Jinnah's legacies. Politics has been hemmed in between either dysfunctional parliamentary democracies or military hegemonies. Economic policies have weaned selected vested groups in the name of import substitution and capital formation. Socially Pakistan has retrogressed from where once Lahore was known as the 'Paris of the East' to a punishment post for most diplomats and foreign business men.

Opening up Pakistan, to SAARC countries and the rest of the world is going to take careful transition management. The time is now for thinking about a 'transition' strategy for a liberal and open Pakistan. There are diverse forces and interest groups who will resist liberalisation - fanatics, economic interests and moralists - and the lines of internal divisions need to be drawn across progressive and retrogressive divides. It is no time for factional schisms based on past political prejudices, ethnicity or Ideologies. The sentiment of progressive change needs to be adopted by both, those in power and those aspiring for it.
Political structures are skewed, economic policies restrictive, social and moral dimensions isolationist. All these flaws need to be repaired urgently if we are preparing for an open borders scenario. The change will bring infinite opportunities and we can be best prepared to exploit these if we have our own house in order first. If we submit to change out of compulsion our internal flaws will be exposed fatally. If we embrace change as rational converts we have a good chance of surviving past mistakes and turning a new leaf. The change is inevitable but what emerges out of the change is in our hands, till hence, at least.

We stand at cross roads of history; either we join those who lived by the sword and died by the sword or those who had the survival instinct to have lived by the sword but not die by it.
Iqbal Mustafa
10 January 2004
1150 words