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This
is the last of the series of my columns, 'Inside View' in which I
have been trying to show glimpses of how the Establishment ticks.
The undercurrent in discourses on specific areas of governance has
been pointing towards a disturbing lack of coherence in thought at
all levels, as many readers may have observed. In this concluding
column I am taking a much broader view of the governance crisis that
has brought the country to the current watershed of identity crisis.
In 'Outline of Philosophy' Bertrand Russell states that what passes
for common knowledge suffers from three defects: It is cocksure, it
is imprecise and it is self-contradictory. There are varying degrees
to which these defects manifest in different beliefs at different
times. The ideological knots in which Pakistan has entangled itself
today, causing such confounding debates, exemplifies Russell's premise.
I will underline the incoherent elements that do not reconcile with
each other. Readers keep asking me for solutions when I present an
analysis; I am afraid this time there will be more disappointment
in store because it is not for an individual to resolve fundamental
beliefs, at least not in a newspaper column.
From May 28th. 1998 when Pakistan's collective mindset (crystallised
over fifty years across all internal divides) made a loud (forgive
the pun) statement in exploding the nuclear device till today, it
has been a continuous process of ideological retractions. Pakistan
stood steadfast in support of Taliban, rigid in stand on Kashmir and
assertive on the right and the capability of being a responsible nuclear
power. In just over four years, the whole edifice of this composite
ideology has come apart. Without divulging into the genesis or the
merit of the discarded positions, I have great discomfort on two counts.
First, the whole process of retractions has been handled with a glaring
lack of logical grace. The symbiotic linkages between Afghanistan,
Kashmir, India and nuclear power capability should have been recognised
and if compromises were to be made for expediency, as they were professed
to be made, it should have come as one composite package of a change
of heart with voluntary enthusiasm. Recanting should have been up
front and honest. Who didn't know that support of Taliban was part
of a larger strategy of 'strategic depth' against India? That alliance
became an unbearable liability in the fallout of the Nine Eleven incident.
The volte-face on that front made the Kashmir strategy illogical but
vehement assurances were given that no compromises will be made on
support of jihad in Kashmir. And that support for fight against terrorism
with US was a strategic move to safeguard our nuclear capability.
All those assurances evaporated as the pressures mounted for rapprochement
with India. At the crescendo of snowballing momentum of peace with
India at the SAARC conference, senior officials unwittingly had to
acknowledge to international press that for the sake of peace, Pakistan
was 'making sacrifices' on Kashmir stand. The Prime Minister said
as much in an interview on BBC. It doesn't need Aristotelian logic
to surmise it as a confession of past actions.
The Ideology began to shred as individual threads were being pulled
out. Before the dust could settle on Kashmir and India, the nuclear
proliferation issue exploded in our face; it was a disaster waiting
to happen since long. The country has made an open confession that
our covert nuclear development program lacked necessary controls.
The foreign Minister went on ARY and International media to rationalise
that national interests could best be protected by an operation whitewash.
At every step of retraction the ubiquitous 'national interest' was
evoked. This is the most 'imprecise' term to use. National interest
is perceived differently by different quarters in the country. There
is no agreement on whether national interest is best served by compliance
or defiance on nuclear issue.
Second cause of logical discomfort arises from the paradox that Pakistan
is acclaimed as an ideological state based on the 'kalima'. Can ideologies
based on theological beliefs be compromised for expediency? National
interests in terms of strategic considerations are a matter of temporal
desires which are secular in nature. All nations openly acknowledge
pursuit of self-interests in secular terms but Pakistan chooses to
remain theologically ideological while pursuing temporal interests,
just like seculars do. Why the aversion to secularity of the state
then? We cannot logically countenance 'Jihad' on principles on one
hand and compromise with secular expediency on the other in the same
breath.
If this ideological duplicity were to be kept aside for a moment,
the pursuit of national interest, as it has been pursued, has become
self-defeating. Cooperation is supposed to be based on some modicum
of commonality in beliefs. We cooperated in war on terrorism on the
pretext of protecting our nuclear assets. We are cooperating in the
peace process with India on open admission of global pressures. We
are promising to cap fanatical militancy in the country because it
is lighting up bush fires up our own pants. We have opened up the
Pandora's box of nuclear proliferation because of external pressures
- the Foreign Minister euphemistically called it our own vision of
threats rather than over pressures; six of one and half a dozen of
other, as they say.
The whole process of dismantling past policies is quite humiliating
in its essence, like a social delinquent reforming himself apologetically
out of expediency, not out of an inner sense of atonement. Perceptions
are a delicate matter. It is said, "If you think honesty is the
best policy, your honesty has already been compromised." We are
deluding ourselves if we believe that fire-fighting measures will
restore credibility and win hearts in the international community.
It is not a matter of who is responsible, anymore. Those in power
cry hoarse justifying their actions and the opposition shoots holes
in their arguments. When the majority of the nation vociferously condemns
indictment of Dr. Khan, when the incumbents refuse to ownership of
past mistakes, when there is no consensus on how to go about on reneging
past strategies, or whether to do so, the signals going out to the
world are not very comforting. It is not a matter of any relief that
Pakistan has wriggled out of harsh treatment dispensed to Afghanistan
and Iraq. Many commentators are predicting onslaught of external pressures
to 'de-idealise' and 'de-militarise' Pakistan. For the past two decades
Pakistan has been strongly linked to drugs, fanatical militancy, instability,
increasing poverty, retrogressive judicial appendages that violate
basic human rights and now nuclear proliferation. There is so much
spring cleaning to do.
A simple whitewash will not hide the stains. As a nation and a community
we need to begin with an earnest change of heart and a coherent revision
of our future ideals. Perhaps I will be blamed for being idealistic
in saying all this but I have no doubts that my idealism (for logical
coherence) does fill a vacuum created by relegation of past ideologies
to the trashcan of history.
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